Sink boundary: A size value controls how much memory an operation writes or reads.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[1] | Argument[1] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sink |
CWE-787 ↗
Out-of-bounds Write
Data is written past the end or before the beginning of its intended buffer.
Attacker's-eye view · buffer-size
A caller supplies a count larger than the destination, turning a bounded-looking operation into memory corruption.
// modeled boundary: Argument[1]
bzero(attacker_influenced_value);
1Find the source of the count.
2Prove it fits the destination.
3Check integer conversion and termination behavior.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[1] as a buffer-size sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | buffer-size | Argument[1] | c.std.bzero.a1 | low · corrob. 1 |