Sink boundary: Input participates in a filesystem path that should remain inside a trusted directory.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sink |
Attacker's-eye view · path-traversal
Traversal segments, absolute paths, or links escape the intended root and reach another resource.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0]
realpath(attacker_influenced_value);
1Resolve against a fixed root.
2Reject traversal and unexpected schemes.
3Check the resolved path before access.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] as a path-traversal sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | path-traversal | Argument[0] | c.std.realpath.a0 | low · corrob. 1 |
| summary | transform | Argument[0] -> Argument[1] | c.std.realpath.a0-a1 | high · corrob. 2 |
| summary | transform | Argument[0] -> ReturnValue | c.std.realpath.a0-ret | high · corrob. 2 |