Source boundary: Network input introduces data that remains attacker-influenced until a later boundary constrains it.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[1] | Argument[1] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ source |
CWE-20 ↗
Improper Input Validation
Input is accepted without validating the properties required for safe and correct processing.
Attacker's-eye view · network-input
A remote sender supplies a value that travels through the application into a sensitive operation.
// modeled boundary: Argument[1]
recvmmsg(attacker_influenced_value);
1Identify the protocol and trust boundary.
2Validate shape, length, and encoding.
3Trace the value to its consumers.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[1] as a network-input source. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Across languages
●cookiejavascript●referrerjavascript●hrefjavascript●datajavascript●namejavascript●headersjavascriptWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source | network-input | Argument[1] | c.std.recvmmsg.a1 | medium · corrob. 1 |