Source boundary: The operation receives data whose origin is outside the current trust boundary.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
No positional argument is specified; inspect the return value or named access path in the model facts below.
CWE-20 ↗
Improper Input Validation
Input is accepted without validating the properties required for safe and correct processing.
Attacker's-eye view · untrusted-input
A caller-controlled value travels through the program until a later operation gives it authority.
// modeled boundary: ReturnValue
secure_getenv(attacker_influenced_value);
1Name the source and trust boundary.
2Validate at the point of use.
3Trace all downstream consumers.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies ReturnValue as a untrusted-input source. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Across languages
●cookiejavascript●referrerjavascript●hrefjavascript●datajavascript●namejavascript●headersjavascriptWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source | untrusted-input | ReturnValue | c.std.securegetenv.ret | low · corrob. 1 |