Sink boundary: Temporary-file creation is modeled because names, permissions, or placement can be attacker-influenced.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
No positional argument is specified; inspect the return value or named access path in the model facts below.
CWE-377 ↗
Insecure Temporary File
Temporary files are created or used in a way that exposes data or enables races.
Attacker's-eye view · insecure-temp-file
A race or predictable path lets an attacker read, replace, or redirect temporary data.
// modeled boundary: ReturnValue
tempnam(attacker_influenced_value);
1Use an exclusive, random creation API.
2Set restrictive permissions.
3Keep the file in a trusted directory.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies ReturnValue as a insecure-temp-file sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Across languages
●mktemppythonWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | insecure-temp-file | ReturnValue | c.std.tempnam.ret | high · corrob. 2 |