Sanitizer boundary: Input reaches HTML or script output where the browser can interpret it as markup or code.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sanitizer |
CWE-79 ↗
Cross-site Scripting
User-controlled input is placed into web output without adequate neutralization.
Attacker's-eye view · xss
A crafted value breaks out of its intended context and executes in another user's browser.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0] -> ReturnValue
escape(attacker_influenced_value);
1Use context-aware output encoding.
2Prefer safe DOM or templating APIs.
3Apply a restrictive content security policy as defense in depth.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] -> ReturnValue as a xss sanitizer. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sanitizer | xss | Argument[0] -> ReturnValue | javascript.lodash.escape.a0-ret | medium · corrob. 2 |