Sanitizer boundary: Input is interpreted as NoSQL query data or operator structure.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sanitizer |
CWE-943 ↗
Special Elements in Data Query Logic
External input changes the intended logic of a data-store query.
Attacker's-eye view · nosql-injection
A crafted object or query fragment changes matching, filtering, or update behavior.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0] -> ReturnValue
sanitize(attacker_influenced_value);
1Separate query structure from values.
2Reject unexpected operators and types.
3Apply least-privilege database access.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] -> ReturnValue as a nosql-injection sanitizer. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sanitizer | nosql-injection | Argument[0] -> ReturnValue | javascript.mongo-sanitize.sanitize.a0-ret | high · corrob. 2 |