Executes raw database text by design; caller input can cross directly into query syntax.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sink |
Attacker's-eye view · sql-injection
Quotes, operators, or comments in a crafted value alter the query's meaning.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0]
$executeRawUnsafe(attacker_influenced_value);
1Use prepared statements and bound parameters.
2Keep identifiers and clauses allow-listed.
3Review raw-query escape hatches separately.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] as a sql-injection sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Reviewed guidance
Safer direction: Prefer the parameterized API and isolate unavoidable raw fragments behind an allow-list.
Unsafe shape
db.$executeRawUnsafe('DELETE FROM logs WHERE id=' + id);Safer shape
db.$executeRaw`DELETE FROM logs WHERE id=${id}`;Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | sql-injection | Argument[0] | javascript.std.executerawunsafe.a0 | medium · corrob. 2 |