Sink boundary: A caller-controlled destination determines where the application sends a user.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[1] | Argument[1] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sink |
CWE-601 ↗
Open Redirect
A user-controlled destination is used in a redirect without sufficient restriction.
Attacker's-eye view · open-redirect
A trusted origin redirects through an attacker URL, enabling phishing or token leakage.
// modeled boundary: Argument[1]
set(attacker_influenced_value);
1Allow-list destinations or use local paths.
2Normalize before comparing.
3Do not reflect arbitrary URLs in redirect responses.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[1] as a open-redirect sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Same behavior
●openjavascript●assignjavascript●replacejavascript●locationjavascript●redirectjavascript●redirectpythonAcross languages
●redirectpython●HttpResponseRedirectpython●redirectpython●RedirectResponsepython●redirectpython●RedirectResponsepythonWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | open-redirect | Argument[1] | javascript.express.response.set.a1 | medium · corrob. 2 |