Sanitizer boundary: XML parsing can resolve external entities from attacker-controlled documents.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sanitizer |
CWE-611 ↗
XML External Entity Reference
XML entities can resolve to external documents outside the intended control sphere.
Attacker's-eye view · xxe
A crafted entity reads local resources or triggers server-side network requests during parsing.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0] -> ReturnValue
fromstring(attacker_influenced_value);
1Disable external entity resolution.
2Use a hardened parser configuration.
3Bound document size and expansion.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] -> ReturnValue as a xxe sanitizer. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sanitizer | xxe | Argument[0] -> ReturnValue | python.defusedxmlelementtree.fromstring.a0-ret | high · corrob. 2 |