Sink boundary: Input influences reflective selection of a class, method, or executable capability.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[1] | Argument[1] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sink |
CWE-470 ↗
Externally-Controlled Class or Code Selection
External input selects classes or executable code through reflection.
Attacker's-eye view · unsafe-reflection
A crafted name selects a type or operation outside the intended allow-list.
// modeled boundary: Argument[1]
spec_from_file_location(attacker_influenced_value);
1Use explicit mappings instead of reflection.
2Allow-list selectable types and operations.
3Keep selected capabilities least-privileged.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[1] as a unsafe-reflection sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Across languages
No cross-language match.
What neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | unsafe-reflection | Argument[1] | python.importlibutil.specfromfilelocation.a1 | high · corrob. 2 |