Deserializes bytes using Python pickle and can execute code during reconstruction.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sink |
CWE-502 ↗
Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Untrusted data is deserialized without ensuring the resulting object is safe.
Attacker's-eye view · deserialization
A crafted payload invokes constructors, resolves types, or creates objects with behavior beyond plain data.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0]
loads(attacker_influenced_value);
1Use a data-only format when possible.
2Select a safe loader and schema.
3Bound size, depth, and resource use.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] as a deserialization sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Reviewed guidance
Safer direction: Do not deserialize attacker-controlled pickle data; use a data-only format.
Unsafe shape
pickle.loads(request.data);
Safer shape
json.loads(request.data);
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | deserialization | Argument[0] | python.pickle.loads.a0 | high · corrob. 3 |