Sink boundary: A server-side request destination is influenced by a caller outside the server's trust boundary.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ sink |
CWE-918 ↗
Server-side Request Forgery
A server fetches an attacker-influenced destination without restricting where it may connect.
Attacker's-eye view · ssrf
An attacker points the server at internal services, metadata endpoints, or unexpected hosts.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0]
post(attacker_influenced_value);
1Allow-list schemes, hosts, and ports.
2Resolve and validate redirects.
3Use network egress controls as a second boundary.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] as a ssrf sink. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Same behavior
●getjavascript●postjavascript●requestjavascript●WebSocketjavascript●openjavascript●getjavascriptAcross languages
●getjavascript●postjavascript●requestjavascript●WebSocketjavascript●openjavascript●getjavascriptWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sink | ssrf | Argument[0] | python.requests.post.a0 | medium · corrob. 2 |