Source boundary: Web-facing input enters the application with an external trust origin.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
No positional argument is specified; inspect the return value or named access path in the model facts below.
CWE-20 ↗
Improper Input Validation
Input is accepted without validating the properties required for safe and correct processing.
Attacker's-eye view · web-input
A crafted request value reaches a renderer, redirect, query, or command boundary.
// modeled boundary: ReturnValue
read(attacker_influenced_value);
1Validate shape and size at the request boundary.
2Encode for the output context.
3Trace the value to sensitive consumers.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies ReturnValue as a web-input source. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Same behavior
●cookiejavascript●referrerjavascript●hrefjavascript●datajavascript●namejavascript●headersjavascriptWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source | web-input | ReturnValue | python.request.read.ret | high · corrob. 2 |