Source boundary: A random value is used where an attacker may benefit from predicting it.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
| Arg | Access path | Purpose | Watched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argument[0] | Argument[0] | The access path Atropos marks for this model. | ▲ source |
Attacker's-eye view · weak-random
Observed outputs or predictable seeds let an attacker guess a token, identifier, or secret.
// modeled boundary: Argument[0]
RAND_pseudo_bytes(attacker_influenced_value);
1Use a cryptographically secure generator for secrets.
2Inspect seed and state handling.
3Check token length and lifetime.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies Argument[0] as a weak-random source. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Across languages
●pseudoRandomBytesjavascript●randomjavascript●choicepython●choicespython●getrandbitspython●randbytespythonWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source | weak-random | Argument[0] | c.openssl.randpseudobytes.a0 | medium · corrob. 2 |