Source boundary: A random value is used where an attacker may benefit from predicting it.
The pack does not provide a callable signature for this record; the watched access path is shown directly.
No positional argument is specified; inspect the return value or named access path in the model facts below.
Attacker's-eye view · weak-random
Observed outputs or predictable seeds let an attacker guess a token, identifier, or secret.
// modeled boundary: ReturnValue
getrandbits(attacker_influenced_value);
1Use a cryptographically secure generator for secrets.
2Inspect seed and state handling.
3Check token length and lifetime.
These checks require the surrounding codebase. The model names the boundary; it does not decide reachability or prove that a guard dominates every path.
Is this a bug in your code?Atropos stops here — by design
Atropos identifies ReturnValue as a weak-random source. It cannot see whether untrusted data reaches this call in your repository.
Lachesis is the codebase-level step: it traces reachability and guards for this symbol.
Check this symbol in Lachesis →Same behavior
●RAND_pseudo_bytesc●drand48c●erand48c●g_rand_booleanc●g_rand_doublec●g_rand_double_rangecAcross languages
●RAND_pseudo_bytesc●drand48c●erand48c●g_rand_booleanc●g_rand_doublec●g_rand_double_rangecWhat neutralizes it
No sanitizer of this kind is modeled.
Model facts · verbatim from the pack
| Role | Kind | Access path | Model ID | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source | weak-random | ReturnValue | python.random.getrandbits.ret | medium · corrob. 2 |